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Consumer Policy in the European 
Community: Before and After Maastricht 
ABSTRACT. The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which the Treaty on 
European Union agreed at Maastricht will alter European Community consumer 
protection law and policy. Two aspects of the Treaty have attracted most interest from 
the consumer viewpoint: the potential forward impetus resulting from the inclusion in 
the Treaty of a specific Title devoted to consumer protection and the potential reverse 
impetus of the principle of subsidiarity. The paper surveys the broad scope of 
Community consumer protection law and policy and analyses subsidiarity as a means 
for sharpening the debate about responsibility for regulating the Community, not as a 
basis for renationalisation of Community competence. The paper attempts to build 
alohgside the process of market integration a set of enforceable consumer rights to 
market regulation. This, more than the new Title, could give real shape to the notion of 
consumer rights, which in the earlier development of Community law has arisen only in 
the context of the consumer as the passive beneficiary of free trade. 
MARKET INTEGRATION AND THE CONSUMER 
The Concealed Place of Consumer Policy in the Treaty of Rome 
Although explicit reference to the consumer is largely absent from 
the Treaty of Rome, 1 the Treaty proceeds on the basis that the 
consumer is the ultimate beneficiary of its economic objectives. The 
transformation of relatively small-scale national markets into a large 
single Community market will stimulate competition and induce 
producers to achieve maximum efficiency in order to protect, and a 
fortiori to expand, their market share. As a matter of economic theory, 
this intensification of competition should serve the consumer by 
increasing the available choice of goods and services, thereby inducing 
improvements in their quality and reduction in their price. 
The Treaty offers no catalogue of consumer rights or interests which 
exists independently of the general notion that the consumer will 
benefit from the process of market integration. In this sense 
Community consumer law revolves around the application of the 
substantive provisions of the Treaty which act as an instrument for the 
achievement of the economically efficient integrated market. 
Provisions such as Articles 30, 48, 52 and 59, which are designed 
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to remove barriers to the free circulation of goods, persons and 
services, and Articles 85, 86 and 90, the Treaty provisions which 
regulate the competitive conduct of commercial firms, are indirectly 
part of EC consumer law and policy. 
Consumer Choice in the Court's Jurisprudence 
On occasion, the Court has made explicit its view that one of the 
functions of substantive Community law is to abolish national rules 
which restrict consumer choice in favour of a freer market where 
widened consumer choice may act as a spur to the development of 
an efficient Community-wide market. The Court has declared that 
the legislation of a Member State must not 
crystallize given consumer habits so as to consolidate an advantage acquired by national 
industries concerned to comply with them. 
The Court has employed this phrase both in the context of fiscal 
rules which favour typical national products2 and technical rules which 
exert a·similar protectionist effect.3 In De Kikvorsch Groothandel4 
the Court considered the compatibility with Article 30 of a Dutch 
rule which required beer marketed in the Netherlands to be made 
according to stipulated typical Dutch techniques. Such a rule impeded 
the marketing in the Netherlands of imported beers made according 
to different traditions. The Court insisted on the primacy of consumer 
choice over State regulation as a determinant of market availability. 
lt declared that 
no consicleration relating to the protection of the national consumer militates in favour 
of a rule preventing such consumers from trying a beer which is brewed according 
to a different tradition in another Member State and the labe! of which clearly states 
that it comes from outside the said part of the Community. 
Consumer choice has also played a part in the interpretation of 
the application of the Treaty competition rules. In Cooperatieve 
vereniging Suiker Unie UA and others v Commission5 arrangements 
which led to the isolation of national markets from cross-border com-
petition were condemned. The Court ruled such practices tobe "to 
the detriment of effective freedom of movement of the products in 
the common market and of the freedom of consumers to choose their 
suppliers."6 
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Consumer Rights in the Court's Jurisprudence 
The expansion of consumer choice in the integrated market, under-
pinned by the application of legal rules which restrain States from 
obstructing trade, may be recast in terms of Consumer Rights. These 
rights recognised under EC law arise indirectly in the sense that the 
consumer has the right to benefit from the fruits of market integra-
tion by buying goods and services from other Member States while 
resident in his or her home State and by receiving information about 
goods and services available in other Member States. The cross-border 
activity in such cases, and any necessary litigation based on substantive 
EC trade law, is typically u~dertaken by the supplier of the goods 
or services. Beyond the right to receive goods and services as the 
passive beneficiary of market integration, the consumer also has the 
right to participate more actively in the process of market integra-
tion. In GB-INNO-BM v, Confederation du Commerce Luxem-
bourgeois7 the Court declared that 
Free movement of goods concerns not only traders but also individuals. lt requires, 
particularly in frontier areas, that consumers resident in one Member State may travel 
freely to the territory of another Member State to shop under the same conditions as 
the local population. 
The Court determined in Luisi and Carbone v Ministero del Tesero8 
that "tourists, persons receiving medical treatment and persons 
travelling for the purpose of education or business" are tobe regarded 
as recipients of services who enjoy the right of free movement under 
Article 59. This seems to guarantee to the consumer as an economi-
cally active migrant rights of entry, residence and non-discrimination.9 
Moreover, the Court is prepared to draw an entitlement to attached 
social benefits in favour of the recipient of services, even where 
those benefits are not directly linked to the service being received. 
In Cowan v Le Tresor Public 10 the Court ruled that the French author-
ities bad to make available compensation to a British tourist mugged 
in Paris on the same terms as would apply to a French resident. The 
decision is relevant to the Community law notion of consumer rights, 
yet it locates that notion in a broader context. 11 More generally, the 
completion of the internal market in accordance with Article 8a at 
the end of 1992 has in principle established the right of the private 
consumer to move freely across borders and to return home with 
whatever he or she pleases for his or her private consumption. 
In this way, consumer rights may be drawn from the Treaty. 
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Discourse in terms of rights is important, not least in the light of the 
Court's own characterisation of the Treaty as the Constitution of the 
Community. 12 The rights described above are rights to integration, 
but it will be explained below that the consumer can also claim rights 
to regulation. This significantly deepens the constitutional structure 
of the Treaty. 
Negative Law 
Provisions of Community law which are directed at removing obsta-
cles to cross-border trade are commonly termed "negative law." This 
refers to Community law's role in forbidding the application of 
national rules which obstruct the integration of the market. By contrast, 
positive Community law involves the adoption of Community rules 
to regulate the market. Negative law deregulates the market; positive 
law reregulates the market. 
The application of negative law proceeds on the assumption that 
market liberalisation which suppresses obstructive national laws is 
in the consumer interest. Yet this may bring the law of market inte-
gration into conflict with national consumer protection initiatives 
which obstruct cross-border trade. "Negative law" involves a poten-
tial clash between Community consumer law and national consumer 
law. 
The Court's ruling concerning the importation of French "Cassis de 
Dijon" into Germany provides a famous example. 13 German law 
imposed restrictions on the marketing of weak alcoholic drink, 
allegedly as an aspect of consumer health protection. The Court was 
unable to discern any coherent way in which such a rule could serve 
the consumer interest. Tue German measure simply denied the German 
consumer the opportunity to try a product made according to a 
different tradition. Tue national rule feil foul of Article 30 as unlawful 
State suppression of consumer choice. 
Negative law extends consumer choice, even consumer rights, but 
its application is not unqualified. Under Community law, a State 
retains a degree of regulatory competence even where its exercise 
may cause market fragmentation within the Community. In contrast to 
the Cassis de Dijon ruling, the Court in Aragonesa de Publicidad 
Exterior SA (APESA) v Departamento de Sanidad y Seguridad Social 
de la Generalitat de Cataluna (DSSC) 14 accepted the permissibility 
of national rules which restricted the marketing of strong alcoholic 
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drink. Such rules obstructed trade, but the Court was prepared to accept 
that the public interest in controlling strong drink was of sufficient 
weight to override free trade and consumer choice. 
The limits of negative law may be further illustrated in the area 
of national rules controlling methods of advertising and sales pro-
motion, where a permissive approach to a national rule in Oosthoek's 
Uitgeversmaatschappij1 5 stands in contrast to the approach taken in 
GB-INNO v CCL. 16 In Oosthoek the Court recognised the risk of 
consumer confusion as a reason for upholding national laws which 
prohibited the offer of inducements as a method of sales promotion. 
In GB-INNO it perceived no sufficient justification for national laws 
which suppressed the provision of information making comparisons 
between goods supplied by different traders. Article 30, by setting 
bounds to the scope of national market regulation, obliges States to 
reassess established methods of intervening in the economy (e.g., 
Meyer, 1993). 
The appJication of negative law to defeat national law involves 
a preference for the consumer advantages of free trade over the 
advantages for the consumer of national regulation which impedes 
trade (as in Cassis and GB-INNO). Upholding the national law, as 
in APESA and Oosthoek, amounts to a recognition that the State main-
tains certain powers and responsibilities which are not overridden 
by the process of market integration. Market fragmentation persists. 
In such circumstances the limits of negative law are reached, which 
implies a need to shift the emphasis towards positive law. Traditionally, 
this would take the shape of Community legislative action in the 
field to establish free trade on common rules throughout the 
Community while ensuring that an appropriate level of protection is 
also secured. 
The balance between market integration and national consumer 
protection, enshrined in the judicially developed Cassis formula, is the 
key to the accommodation of the consumer interest in substantive 
EC law; yet it may be difficult to strike that balance in assessing the 
scope of national competence to regulate the market in individual 
cases. The Court's case law will not be explored in depth here (more 
fully, Reich, 1993, Ch.2; Weatherill & Beaumont, 1993, Ch.17), but 
a fine example of the tensions involved in applying this legal formula 
may be found in Drei Glocken v USL Centro-Sud. 11 The case con-
cerned the compatibility with Article 30 of Italian rules governing 
the composition of pasta, which bad the effect of denying German-
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made pasta access to the ltalian market. The Court found the rules 
to be a restriction on consumer choice which was incompatible with 
EC law. This ruling opened the Italian market to penetration by unfa-
miliar, imported pasta, just as the Cassis ruling opened up the German 
market to unfamiliar, weaker types of drink. However, in his Opinion 
Advocate General Mancini had urged precisely the opposite result. He 
argued vigorously. that simple deregulation of the market would lead 
to hopeless consumer confusion and unfair competition between pasta 
producers. He would have upheld the national regulations pending 
a Community Directive establishing adequate common rules. Yet, 
despite bis insistence on the need for positive law, the Court was 
content simply to achieve deregulation through the application of 
negative law. 
In this line of jurisprudence, the Court has claimed for itself .a 
key role as a Community policy maker. Under Article 30, it balances 
the consumer interest in market liberalisation against the consumer 
interest in national protective initiatives. There is a perceived risk 
that the Court may over-emphasise the former in a way. which will 
suppress even legitimate national consumer protection initiatives (Von 
Heydebrand, 1991). This may cause a "regulatory gap," where neither 
national initiatives are pursued nor is action taken at Community level 
(Bourgoignie & Trubek, 1986). More generally, concern has been 
expressed about the extent to which the Court has thrust itself overtly 
into the political arena (Rasmussen, 1986). However, for the purposes 
of this paper, the key observation relates to the central policy role 
of the Court in shaping the Community's legal order and therefore 
the development of its market. This phenomenon is relatively well 
recognised in connection with negative law and market integration, 
discussed above, but it will be elaborated below how the Court will 
also be increasingly drawn into the policy issues surrounding the 
development of structures for the regulation of the market. 
MARKET REGULATION AND THE CONSUMER 
The Indirect Nature of Community Consumer Policy 
The first part of this paper explained how the consumer interest in 
market integration is not made explicit in the Treaty. This part shows 
how the consumer interest in market regulation is hindered by the 
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structure of the Treaty. The capacity of the Community to develop a 
consumer protection policy is subject to a fundamental constitutional 
impediment. The Treaty of Rome contains no explicit basis for the 
adoption of legislation in the field of consumer protection. 
Measures with a significant impact on consumer protection have 
nevertheless been adopted, especially directives for the approximation 
of national provisions which directly affect the establishrnent or 
functioning of the common market under Article 100 and, after the 
coming into force of the Single European Act in 1987, measures for 
the approximation of national provisions which have as their object 
the establishing and functioning of the internal market under Article 
lOOa. The market distortion caused by the existence of different 
consumer protection rules in different Member States has been viewed 
as a sufficient basis for introducing harmonised Community rules in 
pursuit of a "level playing field" and a liberalised market. More 
broadly still, Article 235 envisages action which is necessary to attain 
Community objectives and it too has been employed on occasion in 
making legislation of relevance to the consumer. 18 
There is no need here to provide an exhaustive list of Community 
measures which impinge on the sphere of national consumer 
protection (comprehensively, Reich, 1993). Illustrations must suffice, 
first in the sphere of consumer safety. Directive 85/374 approximates 
national laws on liability for defective products. 19 Directive 88/378 
approximates national laws concerning the safety of toys.20 Directive 
92159 is concerned with laws dealing with general product safety.21 
In the sphere of protection of consumers' economic interests, Directive 
84/450 relates to the approximation of national laws concerning 
misleading advertising.22 Directive 85/577 concerns the protection 
of the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away frorn business 
premises - "doorstep selling. "23 Directive 87 /102 approximates laws 
concerning consumer credit regulation24 and was amended by Directive 
90/88.25 Most recently, Directive 93/13 on Unfair Contract Terms 
was adopted in March 1993.26 
Such measures have an impact on the consumer interest. Directive 
85/374 is concemed with approximation of liability laws, but by setting 
the rule in Article 1 that "the producer shall be liable for damage 
caused by a defect in his product" it improves the position of the 
injured consumer, especially in States such as the UK which have 
hitherto based liability rules an the fault of the producer rather than 
the defectiveness of the product. 27 Yet, constitutionally, the legal base 
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of Article 100/ lOOa binds all of these measures primarily to the 
process of market integration and the establishment of a common/ 
internal market; for a fuller discussion, see Close (1984); Krämer 
(1986); Reich (1993). Such a market does not lack regulation designed 
to protect the consumer; an integrated market, compatible with the 
picture painted by Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty, cannot exist without 
appropriate regulatory support. This paper does not accept that there 
is a field of market regulatory law which can exist independently of 
the process of market integration; accordingly this paper has more 
sympathy with the approach of Reich (1991) than that of Steindorff 
(1990). 
However, the absence of a Treaty base devoted specifically to 
consumer protection laws has created a legal and political climate 
in the Community which has not been conducive to the promotion 
of the consumer interest per se. In this sense, the Community's 
competence in the consumer field has appeared incidental. An 
appreciation of this background is essential in any assessment of the 
impact of the Maastricht Treaty, which alters the picture by inserting 
for the first time a separate Title under which consumer protection 
legislation may be made. 
COMMUNITY CONSUMER POLICY BEFORE THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT 
Despite the exclusion of consumer protection from the explicit 
constitutional structure of the Treaty of Rome, its status as part of 
the developing structure of Community law and practice earned 
recognition, albeit, initially, largely at an informal level. In October 
1972 the Heads of State or of Govemment called on the Commission 
to prepare a programme of consumer protection policy. This led to 
the Council Resolution of 14 April 1975 on a preliminary programme 
for a consumer protection and information policy.28 The Resolution 
constitutes the first attempt to provide a systematic basis in 
Community law for the protection of the consumer interest. lts Annex 
insists that all individuals are consumers, but, more ambitiously, 
portrays the consumer interest as a distinctive element in society. 
Point 3 of the Annex sums up consumer interests in a statement 
of five basic rights: 
(a) the right to protection of health and safety, 
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(b) the right to protection of economic interests, 
(c) the right of redress, 
( d) the right to information and education, 
(e) the right of representation (the right to be heard). 
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The assertion of this notion of consumer "rights" in the Resolution 
suggests an acceptance by the Council that the consumer interest 
transcends a purely economic, open-border focus. This would have 
elevated consumer policy far above its concealed place in the Treaty 
itself. However, Point 4 provides an immediate reminder of the 
Treaty's failure to include a consumer protection policy which exists 
independently of other Community policies. Consumer policy will 
be amplified "by action under specific Community policies such as 
the economic, common agricultural, social, environment, transport and 
energy policies as well as by the approximation of laws, all of which 
affect the consumer's position." lt then fell to the Commission to 
prepare proposals for the implementation of the programme. 
The 1975 Resolution was followed in 1981 by a further Council 
Resolution on a second programme for a consumer protection and 
information policy.29 The 1981 Resolution is based largely on the same 
premises as those which underlie the first Resolution of 1975. These 
Resolutions have attracted the Court's recognition as part of the 
structure of Community law and policy despite their "soft law" status 
outside the list of formal acts in Article 189. In GB-INNO v CCL30 
the Court held that a Luxembourg law restricting the provision by a 
trader of information about prices was capable of impeding trade 
in goods from States where no such control was imposed - in casu, 
Belgium. The Court drew on the 1981 Resolution in asserting the close 
connection between consumer protection and consumer information. 
The decision supports the liberalisation of cross-border comparative 
advertising through the application of Article 30, even in advance 
of planned Community initiatives to harmonise national laws in this 
area.31 The importance in Community law of the informed consumer, 
asserted in the 1975 and 1981 Resolutions and confirmed by the Court 
in GB-INNO, also finds a place in Community legislative policy. 
Measures harmonising national laws relating to the economic inter-
ests of consumers frequently emphasise improved transparency in 
the transaction in support of the informed consumer, in preference 
to establishing a body of uniform rules about substantive provisions 
in the transaction. Directive 85/577, which concerns the protection 
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of the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away from business 
premises32 - "doorstep selling" - requires a "cooling off" period after 
the conclusion of the contract, which the trader must bring to the 
consumer's attention. Directive 87/102 approximating laws conceming 
consumer credit,33 amended by Directive 90/88, 34 is aimed princi-
pally at improving the transparency of the transaction rather than 
regulating the actual cost of credit. 
The third programme in the series was constituted by a June 1986 
Council Resolution conceming the future orientation of the policy 
for the protection and promotion of consumer interests.35 The 
Resolution draws on a Commission paper entitled "A New Impetus 
for Consumer Protection Policy"36 which confesses to a shortf all in 
performance thus far. The Council Resolution, although relatively 
brief, links the consumer interest to the benefits on offer as a 
result of completion of the internal market, planned for the end of 
1992. The intemal market process, like the common market process 
described above, should benefit the consumer as a consequence of 
the stimulation of competition in the economy. In December 1986 a 
further Council Resolution was devoted to the integration of consumer 
policy in the other common policies/7 lt readdressed the themes 
set out in the June 1986 Resolution and repeated the objective of 
taking greater account of consumers' interests in other Community 
policies. 
Perhaps the most striking change between the 1986 Resolution 
and the 1975 and 1981 programmes is the diminution in the asser-
tion of consumer "rights." The discourse has moved more towards 
the consumer as the beneficiary of the process of market integration. 
Consumer choice, rather than consumer rights, has emerged as the 
dominant theme (Reich, 1992b, p. 25). One of the purposes of this 
paper is to reinvigorate the debate about rights, rather than mere 
choice. 
COMMUNITY CONSUMER POLICY AND THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT 
The Single European Act came into force on 1 July 1987. lt intro-
duced several new Titles into the Treaty which consolidated the 
expansion of Community competence which had occurred incre-
mentally over previous years. The additions included, for example, 
new Titles on Research and Technological Development and on 
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Environmental Policy. However, the Single European Act did not 
introduce a separate Consumer Policy Title. Consumer policy remained 
an element in other policies. Nonetheless, despite the absence of a 
rnajor breakthrough in the recognition of a separate identity for 
consurner protection, the Single European Act had several important 
implications for the status of the consumer interest under Community 
law (European Consumer Law Group, 1987; Weatherill, 1988). 
The centrepiece of Community policy in the late l 980s was the task 
of completing the internal market by the end of 1992, defined in a new 
Article 8a, inserted by the Single European Act, as "an area without 
internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of 
this Treaty." In pursuit of the completion of the internal market, the 
Single European Act introduced amended legislative procedures, 
particularly Article 1 OOa under which measures designed to achieve 
the completion of the internal market may be passed by qualified 
majority vote in Council. This shift towards qualified majority vote, 
rather than unanimous vote, was seen as essential in order to ensure 
the adoption of the package of controversial legislation necessary to 
remove internal borders. Since national consumer protection laws were 
among the range of measures which had been shown to obstruct market 
integration and which had accordingly been harmonised on the basis 
of Article 100, the introduction of Article lOOa had a significant, 
though indirect, impact on the climate for Community consumer 
protection law and policy. lt means that a qualified majority in Council 
is enough to secure the replacement of divergent national consumer 
protection laws by a common Community rule. States have no veto 
under Article lOOa(l). 
A controversial element in this procedure is the capacity conferred 
on the Community to adopt common rules in the pursuit of free trade 
which might depress existing standards of social protection, including 
consumer protection, in a minority of outvoted Member States. This 
concern is reflected in Article lOOa. Article 100a(4) establishes a 
procedure whereby States may rely on "major needs" in order to justify 
setting standards higher than the Community norm adopted under 
Article lOOa(l). The precise scope of the provision remains obscure 
(Ehlermann, 1987; Flynn, 1987), but this potential "opt-out" was, in 
effect, a concession to persuade States to agree to qualified majority 
voting under Article lOOa(l). The notion of major needs under Article 
100a(4) appears to cover the protection of consumers' health and 
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safety, but not their economic interests. Of broader relevance to the 
consumer interest is Article 100a(3), which provides that 
The Commission, in its proposals envisaged in paragraph 1 conceming health, safety, 
environmental protection and consumer protection, will take as a base a high Jevel 
of protection. 
Although this provision is plainly designed to allay fears that the 
Community rules may undercut e.xist~ng national standards of, inter 
alia, consumer protection, its limitations in that regard should be noted. 
lt is addressed to the Commission, not to the Council which is 
responsible for the adoption of legislation. Moreover, it requires only 
that a high level of protection be taken "as a base," which implies 
that it may be adjusted downwards in subsequent negotiation. In any 
event, the notion of a "high level" lacks precision and its interpreta-
tion may vary between Member States. The justiciability of Article 
100a(3) is unclear and has never been tested. lts flavour is more 
political aspiration than independently enforceable legal norm. lt has, 
however, played a part in the reasons advanced for the introduction 
of Community measures impinging on consumer protection. For 
example, Directive 90/88,38 made under Article lOOa and amending 
Directive 87 /102 in the field of consumer credit, refers in its Preamble 
not only to rationales for its adoption which are based on the func-
tioning of the internal market but also explicitly to the desirability 
of ensuring "that consumers benefit from a high level of protection." 
Article 100a(3), although a recognition of the consumer as an 
interested party in the Community legislative procedure, was not 
accompanied by any institutional amendment of the Treaty in favour 
of the consumer (for criticism, see Goyens, 1992, pp. 77-80). The 
voice of the consumer in the Community legislative process is not 
guaranteed anywhere in the Treaty of Rome. The constitution of the 
Economic and Social Committee under Article 193 makes no explicit 
reference to the consumer. In 1973, the Commission established a 
Consumers' Consultative Committee39 which was redefined and 
retitled in 1989 as a Consumers' Consultative Council,40 but even 
this has no legislative right to be consulted. Moreover, its consulta-
tive role within the Commission is of limited effect given that its view 
is sought systematically by the Consumer Policy Service, but not by 
other units within the Commission which may be concerned with areas 
relevant to the consumer, such as competition policy and agricul-
ture. More fundamentally, neither it nor any other consumer 
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representative body has a direct input into the decision making process 
in Council, which is the institution ultimately responsible for the 
adoption of legislation in the European Community. 
Beyond the Single European Act 
After the Single European Act, which still had not introduced a 
specific Consumer Protection title, there followed further soft law 
initiatives. A Council Resolution of 9 November 1989 on future 
priorities for relaunching the consumer protection policy41 consti-
tuted a consolidation of pre-existing policy. Referring to Article 
100a(3), it emphasised the link between consumer protection policy 
and the eff ective completion of the internal market and, more gen-
erally, the consumer benefit which would accrue from the completion 
of the internal market. This was followed by the Commission's 
publication in May 1990 of a three-year action plan of consumer policy 
(1990-1992). 42 Part A of this document briefly covered "Consolidation 
of Progress." Part B provided a "Three Year Action Plan" comprising 
four main areas of focus, selected because of their contribution to 
building consumer confidence necessary to support the realisation 
of the internal market. These were consumer representation, consumer 
information, consumer safety and consumer transactions. 
The first two parts of this paper provide the background to an 
assessment of consumer protection policy in the Community prior 
to the Treaty on European Union. The first part showed how sub-
stantive Community law acts as an instrument of consumer policy 
by promoting market liberalisation. Then followed a survey of a series 
of legislative initiatives which contribute further to the process of 
market integration while also serving to establish Community-wide 
regulatory controls. Soft law adds to the patchwork of Community 
consumer policy, introducing themes such as the informed consumer 
which have been relied upon by the Court. There remains no inde-
pendent Consumer Protection Title in the Treaty; yet there is an 
accretion of a substantial amount of material relevant to consumer 
policy. 
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THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION: NEW TITLE ON CONSUMER POLICY 
The New Title 
The Treaty on European Union, signed at Maastricht on 7 February 
1992, will come into force only when it is ratified by all twelve 
Member States. Once ratified, it will convert the EEC Treaty into 
the EC Treaty.43 A number of amendments are effected to the 
structure of the Treaty of Rome as amended by the Single European 
Act (more fully, Weatherill & Beaumont, 1993). From the perspec-
tive of the consumer interest, the most striking change is the inclusion 
in the Treaty for the first time of a separate Title devoted to Consumer 
Protection. There will be a new Title XI, Consumer Protection, which 
will comprise a new provision, Article 129a: 
1. The Community shall contribute to the attainment of a high level of consumer 
protection through: 
(a) measures adopted pursuant to Article lOOa in the context of the completion 
of the internal market; 
(b) specific action which supports and supplements the policy pursued by the 
Member States to protect the health, safety and economic interests of 
consumers and to provid,e adequate information to consumers. 
2. Tue Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 189b 
and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, shall adopt the specific 
action referred to in paragraph l(b). 
3. Action adopted pursuant to paragraph 2 shall not prevent any Member State from 
maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures. Such measures must 
be compatible with this Treaty. The Commission shall be notified of them. 
The elevation of consumer protection to the status of a Cornmunity 
common policy is confirmed by an addition to Article 3 which now 
provides that "the activities of the Community shall include ... (s) 
a contribution to the strengthening of consumer protection." 
The first paragraph of Article 129a commits the Community to 
the attainment of a high level of protection, whereas Article 100a(3) 
committed only the Commission to that task. This then underpins 
Articles 129a(l)(b) and 129a(2), which establish for the first time a 
competence to act in the field of consumer protection which is fonhally , 
independent of the process of legislating to complete the internal 
market, the subject of separate reference in Article 129a(l)(a). 
The availability of this new base may diminish the vitality of 
arguments against Community action to protect the consumer which 
are founded on legal competence. For example, the diversity of 
national controls over the marketing of tobacco products has provided 
a rationale for Community legislative intervention in the field covering 
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labelling requirements. Article 1 OOa formed the base for Directive 
89/622,44 extended by Directive 92/41.45 The Commission has 
proposed further Community action in the field which would impose 
severe restrictions on advertising of tobacco products. 46 These pro-
posals have been based on Article lOOa with specific reference to 
the high level of health protection mentioned in Article 100a(3) and 
to the 1986 Council Resolution on an EC programme of action against 
cancer.47 An adequate majority in Council has not been assembled, 
however, amongst other things because of objections that action of the 
type proposed reaches beyond the objective of market integration 
and pursues the objective of health protection in respect of which 
the Community lacks competence (discussed by Reich, 1992c). The 
legal force of this rather restricted view of Community competence 
has not been tested; cf. the discussion of Reich (1991) vs. Steindorff 
(1990) as well as Barents (1993, especially pp. 106-109). lt seems 
likely, however, that, in political practice at least, it exerts an inhib-
itive effect on Community action. The availability of Article 129a 
as a base for such action seems capable of removing legal objec-
tions to Community competence in the field, although naturally, 
political and economic objections to formal Community rules in such 
a sensitive area will remain. 
Generally, then, the insertion into the Treaty of Article 129a 
liberates pursuit of the consumer interest from the constraints of 
enforced linkage to intemal market policy. This holds the potential 
at the formal, legal level to clear the way for a significant increase 
in the level of Community consumer policy making, whether con-
nected with substantive law or with procedural matters such as access 
to justice (on Community competence in the field of procedural law, 
pre-Maastricht, see Storme, 1992). However, the elimination of formal 
legal obstacles to such ~xpansion, in so far as they existed, has no 
necessary bearing on .the political climate. lt is true that the oppor-
tunity to act under Article 129a(2) by a qualified majority48 means that 
developments need not be tied to the pace of the slowest member, 
but the assembly of even a qualified majority in Council requires a 
significant political commitment by most of the Member States to 
specific measures constituting an active Community consumer pro-
tection policy. The practical test of the impact of Article 129a as a 
basis for increasing the profile of formal Community action will be 
measurable only some years in the future by reference to the list of 
measures adopted under it. 
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Constitutional Oddities 
Under the new Consumer Protection Title, there arise problems at 
the technical level. One only will be mentioned here (more fully, Reich 
& Micklitz, 1993). lt arises in the demarcation between Article 129a(2) 
and Article lOOa as bases for the adoption of legislation. lt may be 
difficult to determine when a legislative initiative touching on 
consumer protection is properly viewed as a contribution to internal 
market policy or as a contribution to the objectives indicated in 
Articles 129a(l)(b). Not infrequently, measures will perform both func-
tions! However, the distinction will be important in law, because 
although Articles lOOa and 129a(2) employ the same legislative pro-
cedure, they diff er in the flexibility accorded to Member States wishing 
to introduce more stringent measures in the field covered by the 
Directive. Article 129a(3) is more permissive than Article 100ä(4). 
lt may accordingly prove necessary for the Court of Justice to deter-
mine whether a measure relevant to both consumer protection and 
the completion of the internal market is correctly based on Article 
129a(2) or lOOa. 
The Court insists that the choice of legal base must lre made 
according to objective factors amenable to judicial review.49 In its June 
1991 Titanium Dioxide decision involving the choice between Article 
lOOa and Article 130s (Environmental Policy), the Court suggested 
a judicial preference for the former.50 Directive 89/428 dealing with 
programmes for the reduction of pollution caused by waste from the 
titanium dioxide industry contributed to the realisation of the internal 
market, so the proper legal base was Article 1 OOa despite the 
incidental pursuit of environmental objectives. If this preference were 
to prove enduring and to be transplanted to the choice between Articles 
lOOa and 129a, then the independent status of Article 129a as a base 
for consumer protection legislation might be undermined, calling 
into question the advance apparently made in the Treaty of European 
Union towards an independent Consumer Protection policy. However, 
it seems that the Court's preference for Article lOOa in Titaniunt 
Dioxide may have been dictated by institutional considerations 
pertaining to the protection of the privileges of Parliament under the 
competing legislative procedures (Crosby, 1991). Such issues would 
be irrelevant in a choice between Articles lOOa and 129a and there-
fore in such circumstances the Court may prove to be less prone to 
favour Article lOOa over Article 129a than it was in Titanium Dioxide 
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to favour Article lOOa over Article 130s. Moreover, the priority 
apparently placed on Article lOOa in Titanium Dioxide seems to have 
been lightened in a March 1993 ruling51 where the Court found that 
Directive 91/156 on Waste Management was validly adopted under 
Article 130s rather than Article lOOa because its main object was 
environmental protection, with the effect on the market merely ancil-
lary. A survey of this jurisprudence induces doubt whether it discloses 
a choice of legal base according to objective factors, of which the 
Court aspires to be the adjudicator52 (Weatherill, 1992, pp. 309-314; 
see also Lennaerts, 1991). However, it is gratifying that the bias 
towards Article lOOa displayed in Titanium Dioxide, which would 
undermine the independent vitality of several common policies 
including consumer protection under Article 129a, does not seem 
firmly entrenched. 
The Rise and Rise of Minimum Harmonisation 
The minimum harmonisation formula, now constitutionalised in the 
third paragraph of Article l 29a, is already familiar from earlier specific 
consumer protection directives. For example, Directive 84/450 relating 
to the approximation of national laws concerning misleading adver-
tising53 provides in Article 7 that the Directive does not preclude the 
application of provisions of "more extensive protection." Directive 
85/577 regulating the protection of the consumer in respect of 
contracts negotiated away from business premises54 declares in Article 
8 that the Directive "shall not prevent Member States from adopting 
or maintaining more favourable provisions to protect consumers in the 
field which it covers." Stricter controls are not excluded by the 
Directive, although they must conform to Article 30. Accordingly in 
Buet v Ministere Public55 the Court ruled that an absolute prohibi-
tion on "doorstep selling" under French law was not excluded by 
the Directive, nor was it incompatible with Article 30 of the Treaty 
despite its restrictive effect on cross-border trade. Similarly in Di 
Pinto56 the Court ruled that the Directive does not preclude the 
extension of national laws against canvassing to business, rather than 
consumer, transactions. Further illustrations of the technique of 
minimum harmonisation may be found in Article 8 of Directive 90/314 
on Package Trave157 and Article 15 of Directive 87 /102 approximating 
laws concerning consumer credit.58 
The minimum harmonisation model may be taken as an expres-
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sion of an unwillingness to surrender national competence unilaterally 
to improve consumer protection even after the establishment of 
common Community rules (Mortelmans, 1988). The formula is plainly 
potentially detrimental to market integration and it represents a depar-
ture from classic notions of Community pre-emption (Falke & Joerges, 
1991). lt shares this characteristic with Article 100a(4), although in 
detail it is more permissive of State action than that rather obscure 
procedure (for a discussion of Art. 100a(4)'s murkier aspects, see 
Ehlermann, 1987; Flynn, 1987). A Community rule sets a floor ofreg-
ulation, but States may build further levels of varying altitudes upon 
that floor up to the ceiling imposed by Article 30. That structure retains 
the problems of judicial assessment of stricier national measures in 
the light of Articles 30-36 which is excluded under "classic" pre-
emption theory where the Community rule sets both floor and ceiling. 
The minimum harmonisation formula had appeared in the Single 
European Actin relation to working conditions under Article l 18a(3) 
and in the environmental field under Article 130t. Minimum har-
monisation provides that, even after the Community has legislated 
in a field, both States and the Community hold continuing responsi-
bilities for market regulation. From this perspective, it is an example 
of shared or overlapping competence. Thus, Krämer (1993) refers to 
"shared competence" in the environmental field; see also Jadot ( 1990) 
for further discussion, including comparison between Articles 130t 
and 100a(4). Contrary to classic ideas of pre-emption, which confer 
exclusive competence on the Community, minimum harmonisation 
accepts that there is a role for national regulatory initiatives along-
side Community legislation in developing the shape of the regulation 
of the Community market. lts inclusion in the Treaty under Article 
l 29a(3) strongly suggests that this approach will be of increasing 
importance in the future. The technique is given an even higher profile 
in the Overall Approach to the application by the Council of the 
subsidiarity principle, annexed to the conclusions of the Presidency, 
Edinburgh European Council, December 1992: 
where it is necessary to set standards at Community level, consideration should be 
given to setting minimum Standards, with freedom for Member States to set higher 
standards, not only in the areas where the treaty so requires ... but also in other 
areas where this would not conflict with the objectives of the proposed measure or 
with the Treaty. 
In the field of consumer protection, the rninimum Community 
standards must presumably be fixed with due regard to the refer-
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ences to a "high level" of protection which are found in Articles 
129a(l) and 100a(3). This "high level'' then acts as a floor below 
which standards cannot be driven by the process of competition 
between States in choosing f,or themselves their preferred intensity 
of market regulation (cf. Reich, 1992a). 
The Rote of Article 5 
The new legal base provided by Article · 129a, enshrining the minimum 
harmonisation formula, represents the major explicit boost to 
Community consumer policy supplied by the Treaty on European 
Union. It is, however, possible that Article 129a will have a yet deeper 
impact. This possibility arises through the linkage of Article 129a to 
the increasingly influential role of Article 5 in the Community's 
constitution. Article 5 commits Member States to "take all appropriate 
measures . . . to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out 
of this Treaty ... They shall facilitate the achievement of the 
Community's tasks." This may be summarised as a duty of Community 
solidarity. The insertion into the Treaty of a Title on Consumer 
Protection has the consequence that Member States are now obliged 
under Article 5 to further the objectives in the new Title, including 
a commitment to the attainment of a high level of consumer protec-
tion. Even in advance of the changes eff ected by the Treaty signed 
at Maastricht, the combination of legislative initiatives, Article 100a(3) 
and the consumer policy programmes, which have been judicially 
acknowledged, 59 may have been sufficient to trigger Article 5 
obligations on Member States to act in support of Community 
Consumer Policy, but the development of such obligations is put on 
a sounder basis by the new Article I 29a. 
The nature of the obligations cast on Member States· by Article 5 
is affected in specific cases by the allocation of competences between 
the Comrnunity and the Member States, which will vary according 
to the subject matter. For example, States are required not to obstruct 
the application of the Treaty competition rules.60 In areas less 
developed than Community competition policy, the Court has been 
prepared to draw from Article 5 obligations of trusteeship imposed 
on Member States,61 even in the absence of formal Community action. 
Yet the mere fact that the insertion into the Treaty of Article 129a 
triggers obligations drawn from Article 5, however inexplicit and 
flexible, emphasises the Community context within which national 
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consumer policy is administered. lt represents a significant, if inex-
plicit, deepening of the impact of the new Article 129a. 
Article 5 has become increasingly visible in the Court's jurispru-
dence (Temple Lang, 1991). The Court has shown a readiness to 
draw from it obligations cast on the Commission to cooperate with 
national authorities,62 quite contrary to its explicit wording which is 
directed only at Member States. Article 5 is being used to break 
down the Community/State divide and to emphasise that all bodies, 
Community, national and regional, have a role to play in the devel-
opment of the Community framework (Weatherill, 1993). More 
broadly still, Article 5 is a key instrument in the Court's quest to assert 
itself as a constitutional court responsible for upholding the rule of 
law in the Community. The Court appears increasingly tobe operating 
on tbe basis that it holds inherent jurisdictiön, transcending the struc-
ture of specific powers attributed by the Treaty (Arnull, 1990; Barents, 
1993). In the context of tbis paper, the most striking general feature 
of this examination is that the Court has claimed a role as policy maker 
which goes f ar beyond that already observed in connection with mere 
negative integration. The Court is concerning itself with the alloca-
tion of competence and responsibility for the regulation of the 
Community market. More broadly still, the Court is concerned to 
defend the Community's constitution, which, after Maastricht, includes 
an explicit commitment to Consumer Protection. 
SUBSIDIARITY - UP TO AND INCLUDING MAASTRICHT 
The Nature of Subsidiarity 
The previous part of this paper concentrated on positive elements in 
the development of Community consumer policy which may be drawn 
from the new Article 129a. This part examines the principle of 
subsidiarity, enshrined in the new Article 3b of the Treaty, and con-
siders whether subsidiarity undermines the advances referred to earlier, 
representing two steps back where the inclusion of a separate 
Consumer Protection title represented one step forward. lt should 
be noted that exactly the same concerns have been expressed in 
relation to other areas of Community regulatory activity, e.g., envi-
ronmental protection (Institute for European Environmental Policy, 
1992). Is the subsidiarity doctrine the means which the Treaty has 
Before and After Maastricht 305 
previously lacked for halting the gradual expansion of Community 
competence? 
Debate about the subsidiarity principle gives the impression that 
it means most things to most people (generally Constantinesco, 1991; 
Emiliou, 1992). Politically, that imprecision is its allure, as a basis 
for reaching agreement (or, perhaps, disguising the absence of it). 
Legally, that imprecision is its lurking <langer, as a notion which may 
dilute the acquis communautaire. Because subsidiarity is a chameleon, 
changing colour in the eye of the beholder, there is a pressing need 
for the lawyer, if not for the politician, to place it within a general 
theory of the development of the Community and its legal order 
(Micklitz, 1993). 
lt should first be appreciated that subsidiarity is not new. This 
observation applies to the Community legal order generally (Cass, 
1992; Wilke & Wallace, 1990), but it applies equally to the consumer 
field. In 1990 the Commission declared in its three-year action plan63 
under th~ heading "Subsidiarity Principle" that "Practical consumer 
policy must be effectively managed in the Member States on an 
ongoing basis with the management and control of safety, informa-
tion and redress being adapted in each instance to local needs. lt would 
be unrealistic to undertake such tasks continuously at a Community 
level." 
This may be taken as an example of administrative subsidiarity -
or subsidiarity from within (Micklitz, 1993). As a general manifesto 
it is rather uncontroversial. lt is no more than common sense that 
consumer policy be administered at "grass roots" level. That, after 
all, is where consumer problems arise. The Commission's obser-
vation indeed reflects developing practice where, increasingly, 
administrative cooperation is being established between national and 
local agencies in different States (Weatherill, 1991). The deeper 
dangers of subsidiarity lie in a rather different aspect: that of polit-
ical subsidiarity - or subsidiarity from without (Micklitz, 1993). This 
aspect of subsidiarity would not stop at insisting on locating primary 
responsibility for administration at national and local level, but would 
also push for law and policy making too to be returned to national 
capitals. The subsidiarity principle enshrined in Article 3b would be 
employed as part of an argument that the Community's competence 
to act in the field is diminished. Such an argument, if successfully 
advanced, would plainly undermine the vigour of Article 129a(2). lt 
would suggest regulatory fragmentation amid market integration. 
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The purpose of this paper is not to argue that this is wrong as a 
political choice, but to show that a number of legal arguments may 
be employed against this renationalising interpretation of subsidiarity. 
Fundamentally, it improperly disturbs legal responsibility for the 
regulation of the Community market. In advance of the elaboration 
of this argument, it is necessary first to examine the development of 
the subsidiarity principle since the Treaty on European Union was 
agreed at Maastricht in December 1991. 
Subsidiarity Post-Maastricht 
In December 1992, a year after agreement in Maastricht, the European 
Council met in Edinburgh. Ratification of the Treaty on European 
Union remained highly problematic, in Denmark and the United 
Kingdom in particular. Turmoil on international money markets had 
even in advance of ratification threatened the Treaty's commitment 
to Economic and Monetary Union. Against this uncertain background, 
the Edinburgh European Council sought above all to administer an 
injection of stability. The prevailing view was that part of the reason 
for resistance to ratification of the Treaty in Denmark and the United 
Kingdom lay in a fear of undue increase in the power of the 
Community. The principle of subsidiarity was now seized on urgently 
as a means of overcoming such fears. At Edinburgh an attempt was 
made to put flesh on the bones of the subsidiarity skeleton. 
The European Council agreed an overall approach to the applica-
tion of the subsidiarity principle, which was annexed to the 
Conclusions of the Presidency. lt invited the Council to seek an 
inter-institutional agreement between the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission on the effective application of Article 3b 
by all institutions. lt includes reference to subsidiarity as a contribu-
tion to "respect for the national identities of Member States." In 
addition, a report submitted to the European Council by the 
Commission was annexed. This report contained the first fruits of 
the Comrnission's review of existing and proposed legislation in the 
light of the subsidiarity principle. 
The Commission declares that it has withdrawn three proposals 
for directives in the light of the demands of the principle of sub-
sidiarity. One of these impinges on consumer policy. lt is a directive 
dealing with compulsory indication of nutritional value on the pack-
aging of foodstuffs. Consideration is being given to withdrawing 
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several further proposals. A third group of proposals is singled out 
because of the inclusion of excessive detail. These will be redrafted 
in a more general style. This batch includes proposals relating to the 
liability of suppliers of services and comparative advertising. Existing 
rules will be scrutinised during 1993. Directives containing excessively 
d.etailed specifications may be altered to confonn to the New Approach 
and to the technique of setting minimum requirements. These 
Directives lie principally in the area of foodstuffs. 
An even more severe attack on Community consumer protection. 
initiatives was envisaged in a list prepared by the German govemment 
of measures which should be dropped for lack of competence.64 The 
list covered more or Jess every consumer protection measure under 
consideration. This ran counter to the tenor of a Council Resolution 
of 13 July 1992 on future priorities for the development of consumer 
protection policy.65 The Resolution closely followed the June refer-
endum in which the Danish people had narrowly voted against the 
Treaty on European Union agreed at Maastricht. The Resolution 
confirmed the principles of the consumer protection policy, probably 
in part as a response to the sudden doubts which surrounded the future 
of the Treaty, and included an invitation to the Commission to develop 
the policy further, initially by proposing a further action plan. This, 
coupled to more specific initiatives such as the adoption of the 
Directive on Unfair Contract Terms in March 1993,66 suggests that the 
German list was simply an opening gambit and subject to compro-
mise. Moreover, the announcement by Commissioner Scrivener at 
the start of May 1993 that a new three year action plan will be 
launched suggests that the Commission will not acquiesce in a loss 
of momentum. Nevertheless, the readiness of the German govern-
ment to issue such a list stimulates fears about the likely vigour in 
practice' of Article 129a and the perspectives for an independent 
consumer protection policy. 
Subsidiarity in Action: Management of Product Safety 
This may suggest that subsidiarity will severely hinder the growth 
of Community consumer protection policy, but in order properly to 
judge the impact of the principle of subsidiarity in the Community 
legal order, it must not be taken in isolation. Subsidiarity is but one 
aspect of Community policy generally and Community consumer 
policy in particular. The point can be illustrated with reference to 
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Directive 92159 on General Product Safety, adopted in June 1992.67 
The Directive is concerned to approximate national laws which govem 
product safety. A Key component of the structure envisaged by the 
Directive is the institutional support and enforcernent techniques. 
The issue of the powers of the Commission caused much of the 
controversy about the several draft proposals which were rejected prior 
to the final successful adoption of the Directive in June 1992. Title 
III, "Obligations and powers of the Member States," assumes action 
taken at national level and attempts to locate that action within a 
framework which is shaped by the influence of Community law at both 
substantive and administrative level. More controversially, Title V 
of the Directive deals with "Emergency situations and action at 
Community level" and confers powers on the Comrnission to act in 
the sphere of product safety. Articles 9-11 concern the powers of 
the Commission to act. These are rather narrow. They arise where there 
exists 
a serious and immediate risk from a product to the health and safety of consumers 
in various Member States. 
That condition is necessary but not sufficient. Article 9 also includes 
a list of four further hurdles, (a)-(d), all of which must be crossed. 
These hurdles concern a requirement of prior action taken against 
the product by at least one Member State; divergence between Member 
States on the adoption of measures; inability to deal with the risk under 
other procedures; and the requirement that the risk can be eliminated 
effectively only by the adoption of appropriate rneasures applicable 
at Community level. These hurdles satisfied, the Commission must 
then consult the Member States and must receive a request from at 
least one of them. lt rnay then adopt a decision requiring Member 
States to take temporary measures drawn from those listed in 
arts.6(l)(d) to (h). The decision is to be adopted in accordance with 
the procedure set out in Article 11, which requires the Commission 
to submit proposed measures to a Committee on Product Safety 
Emergencies, composed in accordance with Article 10 of the repre-
sentatives of the Member States. As a matter of Community 
institutional practice, this is a regulatory comrnittee,68 whereas the 
Commission had originally proposed a management committee. 
Articles 9-11 of the Directive envisage a "Europeanisation" of 
product safety policy, involving an alteration in structures of decision 
making which were previously strictly the preserve of authorities 
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within the Member States. A network of cooperation and decision 
making which combines national authorities and the Cornmission is 
envisaged. These provisions of the Directive may be explained as 
contributions to market integration because of the risk of divergence 
if Member States were alone competent to act, but they also serve 
to improve the structure of consumer protection in the Community. 
However, the process of "Europeanisation" is relatively underdevel-
oped (Joerges, 1989). The Commission's powers under Articles 9-11 
are subject to significant threshold criteria. Earlier drafts of the 
Directive included lower threshold criteria for Commission action. The 
Commission's 1989 draft69 required neither prior action to have been 
taken against the product by at least one Member State nor divergence 
between Member States on the adoption of measures. lt is a striking 
confirmation of the sensitivity of competence allocation in this area 
that even the relatively narrow competence to act conferred on the 
Commission by Article 9 of the Directive as adopted has provoked 
a. challenge to its validity by Germany.70 (For a restricted view of 
Community competence in this matter, see VerLoren van Themaat, 
1990, but see also the discussion earlier in this paper of Article 129a 
and the extent to which the availability of this base may diminish 
objections relating to competence.) lt seems that it will fall to the 
Court to determine whether Article lOOa permits the substitution of 
Community powers for Member State powers, rather than mere 
approximation of national provisions, where a contribution to both 
market integration and public safety will result. 
These provisions have been dutifully described as subsidiarity in 
action by officials of the Commission's Consumer Policy Service 
(Gielisse, 1992, p. 62; Lorz, 1990, p. 81; cf. Joerges, 1990b). The 
relatively high threshold criteria for Commission action are a con-
cession to the freedom of Member States to decide what they will 
do to achieve appropriate levels of product safety. However, they do 
not concede to States a freedom to decide whether they will act to 
achieve such objectives. States have leeway in choice of administra-
tive action, but must effectively achieve the objectives of Community 
policy in the field. This is the impact of Article 5, which operates 
alongside Article 3b and underlies the specific objectives of the 
Directive. Subsidiarity may mean that the implementation of 
Community policy initiatives should be devolved more readily to 
national and local level, thereby reducing the administrative capacity 
of the Community institutions, but the national bodies assume respon-
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sibilities to fulfil Community policy. There is a shared responsibility 
(see generally/Micklitz, Roethe, & Weatherill, forthcoming). Viewed 
from this perspective, one may appreciate the Commission's disap-
pointment that the threshold criteria were raised to a level which 
will in practice restrict the frequency with which Commission com-
petence will arise (Micklitz, 1992a, pp. 266-267) anp that, more 
technically, the Council preferred a regulatory committee to a man-
agement committee (Gielisse, 1992, p. 63), but these shifts do not 
undermine the fact that national authorities are exercising powers in 
the light of Community policy objectives and are as such respon-
sible for the development of Community policy. Powers have not been 
(re-)nationalised. 
Subsidiarity and Efficiency 
Subsidiarity under Article 3b operates alongside Articles 3, 5 and 129a. 
The principle of subsidiarity is improperly perceived simply as a 
means of reducing the scope of Community obligations. Its focus is 
efficient administration. lt is, as Sir Leon Brittan (1992, p.574) has 
insisted, a "best level'' principle. Member States may be bound by 
obligations on several levels under Article 3b. Where Community 
action is shown to be more efficient than national action, it may be 
argued that Article 3b imposes a duty to empower the Community. 
Where national action is more efficient, that may reduce the scope 
of the Community's power to intervene directly, but it may also impose 
obligations as a matter of Community law on Member States to take 
appropriate action, a fortiori in fields such as consumer protection 
where the Community, after ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, 
possesses a common policy. 
The discussions at Edinburgh in December 1992 can helpfully be 
viewed from this perspective of subsidiarity as shared responsibility; 
as a framework within which Community tasks can be allocated to the 
most efficient level. In the Overall Approach to the Application by the 
Council of the Subsidiarity Principle and Article 3b of the European 
Union, annexed to the Conclusions of the Presidency, it is stated that 
Subsidiarity is a dynamic concept and should be applied in the light of the objec-
tives set out in the Treaty. lt allows Community action to be expanded where 
circumstances so require, and, conversely, tobe restricted or discontinued where it 
is no longer justified. 
This is followed by an important statement of the role of Article 3b 
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as one of the several general principles of Community law, rather than 
as a "trump card" leading to renationalisation: 
Where the application of the subsidiarity test excludes Community action, Member 
States would still be required in their action to comply with the general rules laid down 
in Article S of the Treaty. 
Further opposition to renationalisation via subsidiarity derives from 
the European Parliament's Committee on the Environment, Public 
Health and Consumer Protection. lts February 1992 report calls on the 
Commission to develop further Community consumer policy beyond 
the present "patchwork quilt."71 Later in 1992, an outspoken report 
argued that the virtues of Community consumer policy have been 
inadequately presented and that this has led to calls for "repatriation 
under the guise of the subsidiarity doctrine."72 The Committee believes 
that this would upset the structure of the internal market, referring 
explicitly to the risk of "regulatory gaps" (Bourgoignie & Trubek, 
1986; cf. our discussion in the section on "Negative Law," above) 
which would diminish effective consumer protection. In November 
1992 the Economic and Social Committee added its voice to those 
expressing fear about regulatory gaps and referred to risks of "abuse" 
of the subsidiarity principle. 73 On 19 J anuary 1993 the Parliament itself 
approved a resolution emphasising the importance of the Community's 
consumer protection policy. 
Subsidiarity and Responsibility 
This paper contends that subsidiarity, as part of the general network 
of Community law obligations arising under Article 5, involves 
responsibilities cast on Member States. More ambitiously, it is further 
submitted that those responsibilities may be framed as specific, 
enforceable obligations which are capable of forming the subject 
matter of litigation. They may be translated into individual rights in 
the hands of, inter alia, consumers (Micklitz, 1991; Micklitz, Roethe, 
& Weatherill, forthcoming). 
This quest for rights is of formidable importance. Under EC law 
rights are usually assumed to arise as rights to market freedom in 
connection with the process of market integration. lt has been observed 
that this emphasis on free trade under EC law may override State 
market regulation, the consequence of negative law, although the 
Community by no means replaces at Community level the lost patterns 
of State regulation. (For sirnilar fears about the evaporation of national 
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human rights protection in consequence of market integration without 
the Comrnunity assuming responsibility for protection Community-
wide, see Chfpham, 1990.) 
There may hence develop, in the evocative phrase of Joerges 
(1990a), a Market without a State, wherein neither States nor 
Community can be fixed with responsibility for regulating the market. 
Yet if enforceable rights to regulation can be developed-in Community 
law, a more balanced constitution will be created in which neither 
Comrnunity nor Member States evade responsibility for reregulating 
what is being created by deregulation. This paper, then, is a specific 
attempt to show that rights to a regulated market as well as to an 
integrated market can be drawn from the Treaty, specifically from 
Articles 3b, 5 and 129a. 
An illustration may be drawn from the division of responsibilities 
under the Directive on General Product Safety, discussed above. 
Imagine an unsafe product appears on the market of State A. State 
A is obliged under both the Directive and Article 5 of the Treaty to 
act effectively against the product (Hoffman, 1992). If it fails 
adequately to do so and a consumer is injured, then the State has 
violated its Community law obligations to regulate the market. This 
should apply whether the consumer is injured on its territory or on 
the territory of another Member State. If it has failed to regulate its 
own market adequately with the result that a product released on to 
the market has caused injury, then the logic of the border-free market 
is that its responsibilities do not end at its own borders. lt is under 
a duty to all Community consumers. The consequences of this breach 
of duty seem to have been rendered all the more significant in practice 
by the European Court's ruling in Francovich v Italian State.74 The 
Court ruled that a State may be liable in damages to an individual 
suffering loss caused by the State's failure to implement a directive 
and this ruling is in principle capable of being developed into a general 
proposition that a State's violation of EC law is capable of giving 
rise to liability in damages before a national court (Ross, 1993; 
Schockweiler, 1992; Steiner, 1993). Moreover, liability may attach not 
only to the State, but also to the Commission, which may be the subject 
of proceedings before the European Court under Articles 178/215(2) 
in so far as it may be held responsible for loss caused by its failure 
to act effectively. This may arise if, for example, the Commission mis-
manages the flow of information envisaged by the Directive on 
General Product Safety.73 
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The notion of State responsibility owed to all consumers of goods 
in the Community can be readily extended in principle to the supply 
of services, where, equally, cross-border commercial activity occurs 
in the shadow of Community regulatory rules. Recent legislative 
initiatives in the field of banking and insurance have concentrated 
on establishing Community structures whereby a home State is able 
to license a firm to operate throughout the Community, without further 
control being exercised by the host State.76 Like the Court's Cassis 
de Dijon formula, this legislation envisages a general shift from host 
to home State control. The corollary of this pro-integrative structure 
should be that the home State is responsible for regulating that firm. 
lf the State supervises the firm inadequately and the firm's activities 
cause loss to consumers throughout the Community, the State should 
assume liability for the loss suffered by consumers. In effect each State 
becomes a regulator of activities on its own territory with responsi-
bility for consumers throughout the Community. Precisely the same 
structure may be applied to allocate responsibility for the regulation 
of cross-border misleading advertising (Reich, 1992d). Article 5, 
coupled to Community measures in the field, is in this way employed 
to fix responsibilities on national authorities actively to fulfil respon-
sibilities relating to the regulation of the wider Community market. 
Responsibilities, Rights, and Remedies 
The notion that Article 5 converts national bodies into bodies acting 
on behalf of the Community legal order is already well established 
in application to a particular type of national agency: the judiciary. 
Rulings of the European Court such as Francovich v Italian State,77 
Marleasing78 and Factortame79 are all based on Article 5 and all 
require national courts effectively to protect rights arising under 
Community law, even if that means abandoning established approaches 
under national law (Curtin, 1992). National courts become Community 
courts; this same prescription may be addressed to national adminis-
trative authorities. Moreover, where national agencies fall under a duty 
to act, individuals, including consumers, may be able to claim a right 
to such action; a right to regulation of the Community market. 
The notion of an individual's right to regulation may seem over-
ambitious. lt may even have the feel of an esoteric flourish in the 
face of widespread insistence on the primacy of market integration. 
lt is also right to acknowledge that it is too early to identify any 
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consistent pattern in the ripples caused by the Francovich ruling. 
This paper does not pretend that its structure of State responsibili-
ties yielding individual rights and remedies is as yet fully formed in 
the Court's jurisprudence. Yet the emphasis of Community law on 
individual rights may be traced as far back as the first landmark 
decision on the principle of direct effect, Van Gend en Loos.80 The 
cases mentioned above dealing with effective protection of Community 
law rights concern the realisation in practice of individual rights. They 
constitute a deepening of the constitutional process initiated by Van 
Gend en Loos by focussing on national law remedies, not just 
Community law rights. Van Gend en Loos, litigation arising out 
of the unlawful imposition of customs duties on imported urea-
formaldehyde, was concerned with rights to an integrated market, as 
were many subsequent leading cases, including Cassis de Dijon. 
Francovich is especially important as a concretisation of an individual 
right to regulation of the market, rather than integration. The case arose 
in connection with ltaly's failure to implement a Directive designed 
to offer protection to workers in the event of their employer's insol-
vency. Francovich is all the more striking in its insistence on the place 
of individual rights to regulation enforceable against the State when 
it is appreciated that the Directive in question did not even satisfy 
the normal Community law requirements for individual rights - the 
Directive was not directly effective. 
As a practical point,it must be conceded that rights to regulation, 
even if shown to arise in principle, will frequently be violated in 
circumstances which do not readily give rise to litigation. Tue inter-
ests of the consumer are notoriously diffuse (Reich, 1993; Reich & 
Leahy, 1988). Even instances of large aggregate loss may not provoke 
litigation where each individual has suffered relatively small loss. 
By contrast, the right of the trader to an integrated market is often 
asserted in the context of a dispute about the importation of a specific 
product, ideally suited for litigation. Moreover, just as the consumer 
in State A wishing to complain about trade practices in State B must 
confront significant obstacles (see several contributions to Journal 
of Consumer Policy, 15, No. 4, 1992: Symposium on cross-border 
complaints), the consumer or the consumer representative organisa-
tion in State A wishing to complain about violation of the regulatory 
responsibilities of State B is likely to encounter a range of complex 
problems arising in private international law. lt may prove formi-
dably difficult to frame claims of this type in a way which national 
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courts will be prepared to recognise. This paper cannot investigate 
in depth issues of consumer access to justice, which are certainly of 
major practical relevance to the assertion of consumer rights in the 
Community (Goyens, 1992). However, despite these practical obsta-
cles to widespread litigation founded on the "right to regulation," it 
is submitted that this paper has done enough to show that the 
Community's political institutions are not the sole motor for the 
development of an active consumer policy. Tue European Court too 
is willing and able to engage in policy making and the elaboration 
of constitutional rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Tue conclusion is inescapable that the principle of subsidiarity will 
become an increasingly prominent element in the political debate in 
the Community. Its "constitutionalisation" under Article 3b of the 
Treaty makes it impossible to discount the possibility that it may 
also be tested before the Court, perhaps in a challenge to the validity 
of adopted legislation (Jacque & Weiler, 1990). More subtly, the 
principle can assist in addressing, if not yet resolving, questions of 
"allocation of competence" between States and the Community, which 
are central to the political debate about the future of the Community. 
The subsidiarity debate may help to bridge the gulf between British 
lawyers, who tend to think about parliamentary sovereignty when 
presented with questions about legal competence, and lawyers from 
other Member States more accustomed to federal structures. In fact, 
it is because subsidiarity is an attempt to bridge that fundamentally 
important gap and reshape discourse about the future of the 
Community that it has generated such passion. 
This paper argues that, post-1992, it is both rational and legally 
well-founded to think of shared responsibility for the regulation of the 
Community market. Its thesis holds that subsidiarity, f ar from dictating 
"renationalisation," fits that model of shared responsibility. A deeper 
commitment to the effective regulation of the Community market may 
serve to encourage consumer confidence in cross-border purchasing 
which would bringalive the law ofmarket integration described in the 
first part of this paper and give real impetus to the law of market 
regulation described in the second part. More broadly and ambitiously, 
this may engender greater public confidence in the Comrnunity itself. 
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Article 129a, examined above, was not in any sense the core of the 
Maastricht controversy, yet the consumer policy debate is a testing 
ground for more general discussion about the Community's future role. 
The last part addressed that general issue and provides a legal frame-
work for analysing and enforcing shared regulatory responsibilities 
in the light of the subsidiarity principle, and for recasting them as 
consumer rights. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Verbraucherpolitik in der europäischen Gemeinschaft: Vor und nach Maastricht. 
Der Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit per Frage, wie stark sich der Unionsvertrag von 
Maastricht auf Recht und Politik des Verbraucherschutzes der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft auswirken wird. Zwei Aspekte des Vertrages haben aus Verbrauchersicht 
das stärkste Interesse auf sich gezogen: zum einen mögliche förderliche Wirkungen 
durch die Einbeziehung eines speziellen titels in den Vertrag, der dem 
Verbraucherschutz gewidmet ist;· und zum anderen mögliche hinderliche Wirkungen 
durch das Subsidiaritätsprinzip. Der Beitrag bietet einen Überblick über die gesamte 
Bandbreite der Verbraucherschutzgesetzgebung und der Verbraucherpolitik der 
Gemeinschaft und analysiert Subsidiarität eher als Hilfe zur Schärfung der Debatte 
über die Verantwortlichkeit für Regulierung und nicht so sehr als Ausgangspunkt 
für eine Re-Nationalisierung der Zuständigkeiten der Gemeinschaft. Er versucht, 
entlang des Integrationsprozesses einen Satz von durchsetzbaren Verbraucherrechten 
in Hinblick auf Marktregulierung zu entwickeln. Dem Konzept der Verbraucherrechte 
könnte dieser Ansatz besser eine realistische Gestalt geben als der neue Titel im 
Vertrag. 
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